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Abstract
Do parents alter their investment in their child￿ s human capital in response
to changes in school inputs? If they do, then ignoring this e⁄ect will bias the es-
timates of school and parental inputs in educational production functions. This
paper tries to answer this question by studying out-of-school suspensions and
their e⁄ect on parental involvement in children￿ s education. The use of out-of-
school suspensions is the novelty of this paper. Out-of-school suspensions are
chosen by the teacher or the principal of the school and not by parents, but
they are a consequence of student misbehavior. To account for the nature of
these out-of-school suspensions, they are instrumented with measures of ￿princi-
pal￿ s preference toward discipline.￿The estimates show that, without controlling
for selection, the level of parental involvement is negatively correlated with the
number of out-of-school suspensions. Once selection is accounted for, the e⁄ect
disappears￿ that is, out-of-school suspensions do not a⁄ect parental involvement
in children￿ s education.
￿Maria.E.Canon@stls.frb.org
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Governors.1 Introduction
The recent literature on estimates of educational production functions emphasizes the
impact of school resources and family inputs on children￿ s achievement. Todd and
Wolpin (2003) point out that, when studying the education production process, a rea-
sonable assumption is that the inputs are subject to choices made by parents and
schools. A growing literature provides estimates of educational production functions
that account for these choices (Canon (2010), Cunha (2008), Cunha and Heckman
(2007, 2008), Lui, Mroz and van der Klaauw (2010), Todd and Wolpin (2006)). Par-
ticular attention has been given to how the levels of these inputs are in￿ uenced by
each child￿ s ability. Less attention has been given, partly due to lack of data, to the
interaction between schools and parents.
Parents may alter the investment in their child￿ s human capital in response to
changes in schooling inputs. If there is a high degree of substitutability between parental
and school inputs in the production of achievement, then increases in school inputs could
crowd out parental inputs. Studies that fail to control for this e⁄ect might downward
bias the e⁄ect of school inputs. If instead there exist complementarities between school
and parental inputs, then increases in school inputs might increase parental involve-
ment. Ignoring this e⁄ect might upward bias the role of parental inputs.
The goal of this paper is to empirically study whether parents alter the investment
in their child￿ s human capital in response to changes in schooling inputs by studying
out-of-school suspensions and their e⁄ect on parental involvement. Out-of-school sus-
pensions are de￿ned as the removal of a student from the school environment for a
period of time. Therefore, when students are suspended from school they diminish
their learning opportunities. Do the parents of these students become more involved
with their children?
The use of out-of-school suspensions is the novelty of this paper. Previous studies
1(Bonesronning (2004), Datar and Mason (2008), Houtenville and Smith (2008), Lui,
Mroz and van der Klaauw (2010)) look at the variation in parental involvement due
to di⁄erences in school resources. They either assume that all the missing school in-
puts behave as the input included in the regression or infer parental involvement from
maternal labor supply.
Because out-of-school suspensions are chosen by the class teacher or the principal of
the school and not by the parents, they are a good candidate for exogenous (to parental
choice) variation in the level of school resources across students. Also, out-of-school
suspensions are a consequence of student misbehavior, and thus do not occurr randomly
across students. Therefore, in order to capture the e⁄ect of how parents react to the
decrease in school inputs, I use measures of ￿principal￿ s preference toward discipline￿
as an instrument for the number of out-of-school suspensions. The identi￿cation comes
from the fact that students in schools with stricter principals are more likely to be
suspended. The estimates show that without controlling for selection, out-of-school
suspensions are negatively correlated with the level of parental involvement. Once
selection is accounted for, the e⁄ect disappears￿that is, out-of-school suspensions do
not a⁄ect parental involvement.
By studying the relation between out-of-school suspension and parental involve-
ment, this paper also contributes to the school suspension literature. The education
literature (Mendez (2003), Myers et al (1987)) ￿nds a negative correlation between a
student￿ s suspensions from school and achievement. In the same vein, the Advance-
ment Project and the Civil Rights Project (2000) conclude that the Zero Tolerance and
School Discipline program has devastating consequences for students. Teachers assert
instead the importance of maintaining a learning environment in which a student￿ s
right to an education is respected. Kinsler (2009b) ￿nds that when student behav-
ior and achievement are jointly modeled, suspensions deter students from misbehavior
2but do not harm their performance, giving support to the teachers￿argument. Hence,
do parents compensate for this reduction in school inputs? Do parents become more
involved when out-of-school suspensions occur?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature
on the interaction between schools and parental inputs. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 presents the empirical speci￿cation, describes the instruments, and presents
the estimates. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
To date, few studies attempt to provide evidence for the complementarity or substi-
tutability between school and parental inputs, and their results are mixed. Bonesron-
ning (2004) explores the causal relation between schoolroom class size and parental
involvement in a sample of lower secondary schools in Norway. The interaction be-
tween enrollment and a maximum class size rule of 30 students generates exogeneity
in class size. The results show a weak and generally insigni￿cant marginal e⁄ect of
increasing parental e⁄ort when class size decreases by one, ranging between 0.01 and
0.02 standard deviation. For large shocks in class size (in schools with enrollments
in the (30,35), (60,65) or (90,95) range) parents respond to a decrease in class size
by increasing their own e⁄orts, particularly for changes in class size at lower levels
(15-17 students). Bonesronning concludes that the results support the hypothesis of
complementarity response.
Datar and Mason (2008) also try to identify causal e⁄ects of class size on parental
involvement. They look at students during kindergarten and ￿rst grade in the U.S.
Their child ￿xed-e⁄ect and ￿xed e⁄ect instrumental variables estimates show that an
increase in class size is associated with a decrease in parent-child interaction activities,
no change in parent-school interaction activities, but an increase between 3% and 7%
3of a standard deviation in parent-￿nanced activities. Therefore the authors conclude
that, at least in kindergarten and ￿rst grade, certain types of parental involvement are
complements to class size, whereas other types of parental involvement are substitutes
to class size.
Houtenville and Smith (2008) also estimate parental e⁄ort equations as a function of
child, parent, household, and school characteristics for a sample of 10th grade students
in the U.S. They look at the e⁄ect in parental involvement of per-pupil expenditures,
teacher salaries, student/teacher ratio, class size, and the percentage of the student
body not in the school subsidized program. The authors ￿nd a negative relation between
school-related inputs and parental involvement, which suggests potential crowding out
of school resources. To address the endogeneity of school inputs they use school district
and state demographic characteristics as instruments for school inputs and ￿nd robust
results.
Lui, Mroz, and van der Klaauw (2010) estimate a structural model of migration
and maternal employment decision. Their main idea for the migration decision is that
parents choose a place of residence in part because of employment opportunities and in
part because of the characteristics of the schools in that district. Mothers make their
employment decision knowing that their time has to be divided between work in the
market and investing in her child. They infer whether parents substitute or complement
inputs from this maternal employment decision. The idea behind this inference is that
if school and home inputs are substitutes, we should expect mothers to spend less time
with their children once they start school. The authors ￿nd that once they control for
the fact that families might decide where to live because of school characteristics and
labor market oportunities, school district characteristics reduce by two to four times.
This could be explained if families whose children would anyways perform well are more
likely to live in school districts with the highest productive inputs while at the same
4time work more. In this case parental and school characteristics would be substitutes.
However, as the authors point out, they use county-level school characteristics which
for many locations might not be very realistic.
3 Data
The data used in this paper are drawn from the National Educational Longitudinal
Survey of 1988 (NELS:88). NELS:88 is a nationally representative sample of eighth
graders who were ￿rst surveyed in the spring of 1988. The survey follows the students
for 12 years (1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000). Along with the student survey, NELS:88
included surveys of parents, teachers, and school administrators and represents an inte-
grated system of data that tracked students from middle school through secondary and
postsecondary education, labor market experiences, and marriage and family forma-
tion. (See Appendix A for more details about the survey￿ s sample and characteristics
of each of the ￿ve collection years.)
NELS:88 is a good survey for studying how much parents contribute toward their
child￿ s stock of human capital because it includes a large set of questions related to
family activities that might improve or hinder students￿test scores. At the same time,
NELS:88 provides an extensive set of school inputs at the student level. All these
characteristics might also be determinants of parental involvement.
From the 12,144 students in the entire NELS:88/2000 sample, I exclude those stu-
dents that in 1988 belong to the ￿hearing impaired￿ sample; those students whose
parent, teacher, or school administrator did not return the questionnaire; and those
students with missing test scores.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Kinsler (2009a) mentions that black students
are more likely to be suspended from school; therefore I present all the statistics for the
full sample and by race. The ￿rst part of the table presents demographic characteristics.
5Parents of white students tend to be more educated; a higher proportion than the other
groups have some college education or more. For example, 52% of white students have
a father that attains some college or more, while the proportion is only 41% for black
students. The di⁄erences between mothers￿education for white and black students is
much less: 48% have at least some college versus 43%, respectively.
Di⁄erences are also important for family income and family structure. The average
family income for black students in 1988 was $23,700, while it was $40,800 for white
students. Black students are also more likely to live in a single-parent household. In
1988, 13% of white students in the sample lived in a single-parent household, versus
36% of the black students. Black students also have on average more siblings than their
white counterparts: an average of 2.69 for black students and 2.07 for white.
The proportion of black students that are suspended (12.1%) is more than two times
that of whites (5.6%). This di⁄erence is in line with what Kinsler (2009a) ￿nds for the
sample of students from North Carolina. Finally, the table shows that black students
perform on average one standard deviation lower than whites in their math test score.
Table 2 presents the statistics by income level. For students from families with
income below the poverty line, di⁄erences across race are not that important. However,
the proportion of white students below the poverty line is much lower than that of black
students (9.2% for white versus 37.3% for blacks).
Tables 3 and 4 present descriptive statistics of parental involvement measures. Fol-
lowing the literature, I consider homework assistance, discussing things the child has
studied in class, and attending school meetings as measures of parental involvement.
The statistics show that di⁄erences in parental involvement are larger across family
income level than across race. Parents with income above the poverty line are more
likely to be involved, and, on average, are involved more often. Among families with
income above the poverty line, 40.1% of the parents help with their child￿ s homework
6sometimes and 8.5% do so often. For students with family income below the poverty
line, only 31.4% of the parents help them sometimes and 9% do so often. Di⁄erences
are similar for many of the other measures of parental involvement.
4 Empirical Speci￿cation
As I guide to my empirical analysis, I set up model of household production and time
allocation. The framework is similar to Todd and Wolpin (2003), but I focus on the
choice of home inputs, parental e⁄ort, and school inputs. I assume that parents maxi-
mize utility derived from consumption, leisure, and their child￿ s achievement:
maxh;e;sU(c;l;a)
subject to (i) a production function of achievement, (ii) a time contraint, and (iii)
a budget constraint:(i) The production function of achievement (a) depends on school
inputs (s(t)); parental involvement, i.e., home inputs, (e); and the child￿ s ability to
learn (￿). Note that school inputs depend on the child￿ s attendance, t, which can vary
in the interval [0;T] and where T is full attendance:
a = [￿s(t)





(ii) The time constraint, where h is the total number of hours worked, l is leisure, and
e is parental involvement, is:
l = 1 ￿ h ￿ e
(iii) The a budget constraint is:
wh = c + s(T)p
7Here I am assuming that parents choose the quality of the school, s(:), and they pay
the tuition independently of the child￿ s attendance.
The optimal parental involvement can be obtained from the ￿rst-order conditions












The level of involvement will depend on the complementarity or substitutability of home
and school inputs, as well as on the amount of school inputs￿i.e., its quality, s(:), and
the child￿ s attendance, t.
Ideally, one would like to study empirically the e⁄ect of school inputs on the proba-
bility of parents becoming involved in their child￿ s achievement-related activities. How-
ever, the optimal level of parental involvement depends on the quality of the school,
which is also chosen by parents. Therefore to be able to isolate the e⁄ect of school
resources on how involved parents are in their child￿ s school-related activities, I need
to have some exogenous (to parental choice) variation in the level of school resources.
Out-of-school suspensions are chosen by the teacher or the principal of the school
and therefore are a candidate for exogenous (to parental choice) variation in the level
of school resources. The goal is to estimate the probability that parents get involved in
their child￿ s school-related activities as follows:
Pr(￿pinvolvement￿= 1) = ￿0 + ￿1et + ￿2st + ￿3osst + ￿4ht￿1 + ￿t (1)
where et is a vector of home characteristics in period t, st is a vector of school charac-
teristics in period t, osst is the number of out-of-school suspensions in period t, and
ht￿1 is the lagged math test score.
Out-of-school suspensions are de￿ned as the removal of a student from the school
environment for a period of time. Out-of-school suspensions are in most cases a re-
8sponse to the student￿ s misbehavior and consequently not exogenous to the student￿ s
characteristics. Therefore, the estimates from equation (1) will be biased if there is un-
observed heterogeneity that a⁄ects both out-of-school suspensions and parental e⁄ort.
The problem arises if there is correlation between which students are suspended and
characteristics of these students that are not included in the regression analysis. For
instance, suppose that parents choose how much to help their child in school-related
activities according to how much they value education. It could be then the case that
students whose parents do not care about education also do not themselves care about
education and might misbehave in school and receive more out-of-school suspensions.
In that case, if we look at the relation between parental e⁄ort and out-of-school sus-
pensions, we would underestimate the e⁄ect of parents compensating for the decrease
in school inputs.
To avoid this underestimation, I propose obtaining exogenous variation by instru-
menting the number of out-of-school suspensions with measures of the school principal￿ s
preference toward discipline. In the rest of this section, I explain how I construct such
a measure and then present the estimation results.
4.1 Instrument
The school administrator completed one questionnaire each survey year. The adminis-
trator questionnaire gathered descriptive information about the school￿ s teaching sta⁄,
the school climate, characteristics of the student body, and school policies and o⁄erings.
School administrators were asked, among other school policy questions, what happens
in the school when a student breaks school rules. The school could take no action or
take a minor disciplinary action. The school could also put the student in an in-school
suspension or an out-of-school suspension or expel the student from the school. The
events that principals were asked about are listed in Table 5. This table shows the
9percentage of schools that use out-of-school suspensions for each of those events.
One caveat is that principals might want to punish a certain action or event if that
event is a common problem among the students in the school. If students that misbehave
are in schools with a higher proportion of misbehaving peers and thus, principals are
stricter, the measure will still be correlated with the student￿ s type and therefore will
not be a valid instrument.
In their questionnaire, principals were asked if the events in Table 5 were a problem
among the students in their school as well as the severity of the problem. This informa-
tion allows me to overcome the caveat just mentioned. Table 6 shows the percentage of
schools where each of the events is a moderate or severe problem. While some events
such as absentism or alcohol use are a moderate or severe problem in more than half of
the schools in the sample, other events such as physical abuse of teachers is a problem
in only 26.1% of the schools.
Table 5 shows the percentage of schools that use out-of-school suspensions for each
event. Table 6 shows the percentage of schools where each of these events is a moderate
or severe problem. However, these tables do not show how many schools use out-of-
school suspensions as a deterrent to prevalent problems among their students. Knowing
which, if any, schools use suspensions to deter an existing problem is important for
determining variation in school policies. To study this I construct two measures, which
are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
The ￿rst measure, presented in Table 7, is how many schools use out-of-school
suspensions to deter an existing problem. For this measure I calculate how many
schools meet both these criteria: the event is a moderate or severe problem and out-
of-school suspensions (OSS) are used as a deterrent for the event; I then calculate this
measure as a fraction of all the schools where each event is a severe or moderate problem.
Almost half of the schools where alcohol possession is a problem use an out-of-school
10suspension as a disciplinary response. Yet, only a very small fraction of schools where
physical abuse of teachers is a problem use an out-of-school suspension for that event.
Table 8 shows the schools that meet both criteria: the event is a moderate or severe
problem and the school used an out-of-school suspension as a disciplinary response, as a
fraction of all the schools that suspend for each event. As for the previous measure, we
observe dispersion in principals￿disciplinary actions. While nearly 60% of schools that
use an out-of-school suspension for skipping school considered it a moderate or severe
problem, only 0.3% of the out-of-school suspensions for physical abuse of teachers were
from schools where it was a signi￿cant problem.
Table 7 and Table 8 give evidence that variation exists in schools￿disciplinary de-
cisions. There are schools where a certain event is a problem among their students,
but the school does not take a disciplinary action. In some other schools, instead, a
principal suspends students even though the event is not a moderate or severe problem.
To get measures of the principals￿preference toward discipline, I proceed as follows.
For each event I regress the disciplinary decision that the principal takes on whether
this event is a particular problem among the students at the school. The explanatory
variable takes four values indicating the severity of the problem: not a problem, a
minor problem, a moderate problem, and a serious problem. I keep the residual as the
toughness of the principal regarding that event￿or the principals￿preference toward
discipline. The identifying assumption is the following: Consider two schools where a
certain action is not a problem among the students. In one of those schools, students
receive an out-of-school suspension for taking that action; in the other, students do
not receive a suspension. Students in the ￿rst school, therefore, are more likely to be
suspended independently of their type. In my analysis, I do not consider cheating on
tests, smoking at school, class disturbance, and profanity in class because I cannot
control for whether it is a problem at the school or not.
114.2 Estimation Results
The results estimating the e⁄ect of out-of-school suspensions are presented in Tables 9
through 12. Table 9 shows the probit estimates of equation (1) for the di⁄erent measures
of parental involvement. The estimates for all measures are negatively correlated with
out-of-school suspensions, and these relations are statistically di⁄erent from zero. For
the mean student, an in￿nitesimal increase in out-of-school suspensions decreases the
probability of parental help with homework by 1.7% and decreases the probability that
parents check their child￿ s homework by 1.7% as well. Out-of-school suspensions also
decrease the probability that the student will discuss classwork with his parent by 2.2%,
and decreases the probability that the child and his parents will discuss course selection
by 1.7%. Performing higher on 8th grade math test scores decreases the probability
of parental involvement in homework-related activities, but increases the probability
of parental participation in selecting courses. These results jointly give evidence that
selection might be a⁄ecting the results. This revisits the argument that parents choose
how much they become involved in their child￿ s school-related activities based on how
much they value education. Then, if it is the case that students whose parents do
not value education much also do not value education, they are more likely to both be
suspended and perform lower in their math test score. On the other end of the test score
distribution, students that perform very well do not need help with their homework.
But, if their parents value education, they will discuss course selection with their child.
Therefore, to obtain causal estimates I have at least two alternatives. One option is
to evaluate students￿￿xed e⁄ects. By taking ￿rst di⁄erences I eliminate all students￿ ,
families￿ , and schools￿characteristics that remain ￿xed over time. Alternatively, I can
instrument the number of out-of-school suspensions with a variable that is correlated
with out-of-school suspensions but uncorrelated with unobserved characterists a⁄ecting
both the level of parental involvement and out-of-school suspensions. Unfortunately, not
12all the parental variables presented in Table 9 are observed both in 10th and 12th grade.
Therefore I will ￿rst show the results when I instrument out-of-school suspensions. I
will then estimate ￿rst di⁄erences for the two measures that are observed over time, as
a robustness for the instrumental variables.
Table 10 shows the ￿rst-stage estimates for the case where out-of-school suspensions
are instrumented by measures of principals￿preference toward discipline. Some of the
measures of how strict the principal is are useful for predicting the number of out of
school suspensions. Being more strict on the use of illegal drugs at school is negatively
correlated with the number of out-of-school suspensions, while students with principals
that are stricter in terms of abuse of teachers receive more out-of-school suspensions.
Table 11 shows the estimates when out-of-school suspensions are instrumented by
measures of a principal￿ s preference toward discipline. Once out-of-school suspensions
are instrumented they are no longer statistically signi￿cant in explaining parental in-
volvement. This result is consistent across all measures of parental involvement. These
results are consistent with Bonesronning (2004) who ￿nds a weak and generally insignif-
icant marginal e⁄ect of increasing parental e⁄ort when class size decreases for a sample
of lower secondary schools in Norway.
An alternative to avoid student characteristics contaminating the e⁄ect of out-of-
school suspensions on parental involvement is to estimate ￿rst di⁄erences. Unfortu-
nately not all the parental variables presented in Tables 9 and 11 are observed both in
10th and 12th grade. Table 12 presents the ￿rst di⁄erence estimates of out-of-school
suspensions in the change in parental involvement. The results are in line with the
results in Table 11: Out-of-school suspensions do not signi￿cantly a⁄ect parental in-
volvement.
135 Concluding remarks
This paper examines whether parents responded to changes in school inputs. In par-
ticular I focus my analysis on out-of-school suspensions. Out-of-school suspensions are
chosen by the principal and the teacher of the school and are therefore exogenous to
parental choice. Also, out-of-school suspensions are a consequence of student misbe-
havior, and thus do not occurr randomly across students. Therefore, in order to obtain
causal estimates of the e⁄ect of school inputs on parents￿involvement, I instrument the
number of out-of-school suspensions with measures of ￿principal￿ s preference toward dis-
cipline.￿I show that the instrument predicts the number of out-of-school suspensions.
The estimates show that, without controlling for selection, out-of-school suspensions
are negatively correlated with the level of parental involvement. Once selection is taken
into account, the e⁄ect disappears. At least for this sample, parents of 10th graders
do not tend to adjust their involvement in their child￿ s education to changes in school
inputs. This result is in line with Bonesronning (2004).
For the literature in out-of-school suspensions, the results on this paper support the
hypothesis that out-of-school suspensions do not have a signi￿cant impact on students￿
achievement. Parents￿of students that get suspended are not more involved. That is,
there is no evidence that these parents are compensating their child for the forgone
school inputs.
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Skipping school (1 or 2 days) 28.5
Skipping school (3 + days) 45.2





Use alcohol at school 80.2
Use drugs at school 72.9
Smoke at school 46.3
Verbally abuse teachers 68.2
Physically abuse teachers 39.3
Theft of school property 77.9
Class disturbance 30.4
Profanity in class 35.8
Table 6: School Characteristics
Event Proportion Listing as
Moderate or Severe Problem
Absentism 65.7
Physical con￿ icts among students 35.2
Use of alcohol 54.3
Use of illegal drugs 44.1
Verbal abuse of teachers 31.5
Physical abuse of teachers 26.1
Robbery or theft 32.5
Table 7: Schools that use OSS and event is a problem as a fraction of
schools where event is a problem
Event #
Skipping school 20.2
Physical injury to students 24.1
Use of alcohol at school 42.9
Use of illegal drugs at school 32.7
Verbally abuse teachers 11.5
Physically abuse of teachers 0.4
Theft of school property 19.1




Physical injury to students 13.3
Use of alcohol at school 38.7
Use of illegal drugs at school 26.6
Verbally abuse teachers 6.8
Physically abuse of teachers 0.3
Theft of school property 10.9
Table 9: Estimates parental involvement measures
Help with hw Check hw Material studied Course selection
in class
Suspensions -0.065 -0.070 -0.091 -0.077
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Math test score 8th G -0.012 -0.006 0.002 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Teacher experience 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1/(prop class time teacher -0.036 -0.088 -0.053 -0.050
spends maintain. order) (0.093) (0.094) (0.095) (0.099)
Note: all speci￿cations control for family income, parents￿education, race, sex, number of
siblings, single parent and geographical region. Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 10: First stage estimates
24Help with hw Check hw Material studied Course selection
in class
Math test score 8th G -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Use of illegal drugs at school -0.074 -0.070 -0.071 -0.072
(0.034) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036)
Skipping school 0.027 0.032 0.033 0.033
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Physical injury to students 0.035 0.026 0.028 0.023
(0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Use of alcohol at school 0.016 -0.005 -0.001 0.001
(0.035) (0.046) (0.036) (0.037)
Verbal abuse of teachers 0.031 0.022 0.028 0.018
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
Physical abuse of teachers 0.007 -0.003 0.002 -0.007
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
Robbery or theft 0.010 0.008 0.001 0.007
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Note: all speci￿cations control for family income, parents￿education, race, sex, number of
siblings, single parent and geographical region. Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 11: IV estimates for parental involvement measures
Help with hw Check hw Material studied Course selection
in class
Suspensions 0.702 -0.402 -0.662 -0.602
(0.546) (0.846) (0.518) (0.659)
Math test score 8th G -0.005 -0.009 -0.001 0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Teacher experience 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1/(prop class time teacher 0.011 -0.093 -0.049 -0.128
spends maintain. order) (0.103) (0.111) (0.104) (0.107)
Note: all speci￿cations control for family income, parents￿education, race, sex, number of
siblings, single parent and geographical region. Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 12: First di⁄erence estimates for parental involvement measures




Change in lag math test score 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Change in Family Income -0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.002)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
266 Appendix A: More Characteristics of NELS:88
NELS:88 is a nationally representative sample of eighth-graders that were ￿rst surveyed
in the spring of 1988. The original sample employed a two-stage sampling design,
selecting ￿rst a sample of schools and then a sample of students within these schools.
In the ￿rst stage the sampling procedure set the probabilities of selection proportional to
the estimated enrollment of eighth grade students. In the second stage 26 students were
selected from each of those schools, 24 randomly and the other two were selected among
hispanic and Asian Islander students, resulting in approximately 25,000 students. A
sample of these respondents (18,221) were then resurveyed through four follow-ups in
1990, 1992, 1994, and 12,144 were interview again in 2000. Along with the student
survey, NELS:88 included surveys of parents, teachers, and school administrators. By
beginning with the 8th-grade, NELS:88 was able to capture the population of early
dropouts￿ those who left school prior to spring term of 10th grade￿ as well as later
dropouts (who left after spring of 10th grade). The study was designed not only to
follow a cohort of students over time but also to ￿freshen￿the sample at each of the
￿rst two follow-ups, and thus to follow multiple grade-de￿ned cohorts over time. Thus,
10th grade and 12th grade cohorts were included in NELS:88 in the ￿rst follow-up
(1990) and the second follow-up (1992), respectively. In late 1992 and early1993, high
school transcripts were collected for sample members, and, in the fall of 2000 and early
2001, postsecondary transcripts were collected, further increasing the analytic potential
of the data.
Next the characteristics of each of the data collection years are summarize (See
National Center for Education Statistics (2002) for a complete description):
Base-Year Study. The base-year survey for NELS:88 was carried out during the
1988 spring semester. The study employed a clustered, strati￿ed national probability
sample of 1,052 public and private 8th-grade schools. Almost 25,000 students across
27the United States participated in the base-year study. Questionnaires and cognitive
tests were administered to each student in the NELS:88 base year. The student ques-
tionnaire covered school experiences, activities, attitudes, plans, selected background
characteristics, and language pro￿ciency. School principals completed a questionnaire
about the school; two teachers of each student were asked to answer questions about
the student, about themselves, and about their school; and one parent of each student
was surveyed regarding family characteristics and student activities.
First Follow-up Study. Conducted in 1990, when most sample members were
high school sophomores, the ￿rst follow-up included the same components as the base-
year study, with the exception of the parent survey. The study frame included 19,363
in-school students, and 18,221 sample members responded. Importantly, the ￿rst follow-
up study tracked base-year sample members who had dropped out-of-school, with 1,043
dropouts taking part in the study. Overall, the study included a total of 19,264 partic-
ipating students and dropouts. In addition, 1,291 principals took part in the study, as
did nearly 10,000 teachers.
Second Follow-up Study. The second follow-up took place early in 1992, when
most sample members were in the second semester of their senior year. The study
provided a culminating measurement of learning in the course of secondary school and
also collected information that facilitated the investigation of the transition into the
labor force and postsecondary education. The NELS:88 second follow-up resurveyed
students who were identi￿ed as dropouts in 1990, and identi￿ed and surveyed additional
students who had left school since the previous wave. For selected subsamples, data
collection also included the sample member￿ s parents, teachers, school administrators,
and academic transcripts.
Third Follow-up Study (NELS:88/94). The NELS:88 third follow-up took
place early in 1994. By this time in their educational careers, most of the sample
28members had already graduated from high school, and many had begun postsecondary
education or entered the workforce. The study addressed issues of employment and
postsecondary access and was designed to allow continuing trend comparisons with
other NCES longitudinal studies. The sample for this follow up was created by dividing
the second follow-up sample in 18 groups based on their response history, dropout
status, eligibility status, school sector type, race, test score, socioeconomic status and
freshened status. Each group was assigned an overall selection probability. Cases within
a group were selected such that the overall probability was met, and the probability of
selection within the group was proportional to each sample member second follow-up
weight. The ￿nal sample size was 15,875 individuals.
Fourth Follow-up Study (NELS:88/2000). The fourth follow-up to NELS:88
(NELS:88/2000) included interviews with 12,144 members of the three NELS:88 sample
cohorts 12 years after the base-year data collection (For costs reasons the third follow-up
sample was subsample to limit the numbers of poor and di¢ cult respondents and those
who were unlikely to be located (those who couldn￿ t be located during earlier follow-up
interviews). From here 15,649 individuals were selected and 12,144 of them completed
the survey). Because these data represent the period 6 years after the last contact with
the sample, they will enable researchers to explore a new set of educational and social
issues about the NELS:88 respondents. For example, in 2000, most of the participants
from the various cohorts of NELS:88 had been out of high school for 8 years and were 26
years old. At this age, the majority of students who intend to enroll in postsecondary
schools will already have done so. Thus, a large proportion of students have completed
college; some completed graduate programs. Many of these young people are successful
in the market place, while others have had less smooth transitions into the labor force.
29